The likely resurgence of air tra±c in the U.S. means that airport congestion is a problem that must soon be confronted by policy makers. As part of their policy response, it is probable that some form of congestion pricing will be imposed at selected U.S. airports in the relatively near future. The theory developed in this paper, which extends the results of Brueckner (2002), provides an important guide for the formulation of congestion pricing rules. In particular, the theory says that the congestion tolls levied on the various airlines at a particular airport should generally be di®erent, with the tolls being inversely related to a carrier's airport°ight share. Internalization of airport congestion is the reason for this inverse relationship. In operating another peak°ight, a carrier takes account of the congestion damage imposed on the other°i ghts it operates. If these°ights account for a large share of the airport's tra±c, then most of the congestion created by the additional°ight is internalized, justifying a low toll. By contrast, if the carrier operates only a few of the airport's°ights, then little internalization occurs, and a high toll is needed to force the carrier to take into account the congestion damage it causes. The resulting°ight-share rule is easy to implement, and it could help policymakers design proper toll systems at U.S. airports.
Introduction
Airport congestion and°ight delays became serious problems in the U.S. at the end of the 1990s. Although the fall-o® in air tra±c after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 reduced congestion levels at U.S. airports,°ight delays are likely to become a problem again once air tra±c returns to its long-term growth trend. While the expansion of airport capacity o®ers a potential remedy for the congestion problem, the high cost and long gestation periods of such investment projects limit their attractiveness. More-immediate relief is o®ered by measures that allow better use of existing airport infrastructure. Such measures include improvements in air tra±c control technology, which allows busy airports to handle more tra±c while generally increasing the capacity of the airspace. In addition, airport congestion pricing, which diverts°i ghts to o®-peak hours by raising the level of landing fees during peak periods, is now frequently discussed as a remedy for the delay problem (for example, see Transportation Research Board, 2000) . Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration is considering the imposition of congestion pricing at New York's La Guardia airport, one of the most congested in the nation.
The theory of congestion pricing has been developed mainly in the context of road pricing (see Small (1992) for a survey). The theory shows that peak usage of a road or other congested facility is excessive because each user does not take into account the delays he imposes on fellow users. Peak usage can be optimally restricted by imposing a congestion toll equal to the cost of the external delays that each user generates.
The earliest contributions applying this principle to the case of airports include Levine (1969) , Carlin and Park (1970) , Morrison (1983) , Morrison and Winston (1989) , and Oum and Zhang (1990) . However, more recent work by Daniel (1995 Daniel ( , 2001 ), Daniel and Pahwa (2000) , and Brueckner (2002) recognizes a crucial di®erence between the airport and road contexts not appreciated by the early papers. In particular, while road users are properly viewed as atomistic, with each user accounting for a tiny share of total tra±c, airlines must be viewed as nonatomistic given that one or two carriers operate most of the°ights at the highly congested U.S. airports. For example, United and American each operate around 40 percent of the°ights at Chicago-O'Hare, while Delta operates over 70 percent of Atlanta's°ights. As a result, an atomistic model of congestion will be inappropriate when applied in an airport context. When the atomistic model is abandoned, the verdict on congestion is softened. Although atomistic users of a congested facility ignore their external e®ects, Brueckner (2002) shows that a nonatomistic airline takes into account a portion of the congestion caused by each of its°ights. In particular, the airline internalizes the congestion each°ight imposes on the other°ights it operates. In the monopoly case, all congestion is internalized, while in the symmetric oligopoly case, each carrier internalizes a fraction ® of the congestion caused by an extra°ight, where ® equals each carrier's airport°ight share. In the model, airlines internalize the operating cost of congestion as well as passenger time costs, which are captured because congestion is capitalized into lower fares. Daniel (1995) o®ers a related analysis.
These conclusions suggest that, in the airport case, the overallocation of°ights to the peak period may not be as severe as the atomistic model would predict. Correspondingly, the optimal congestion toll is lower than the one that would be generated by the standard roadpricing formula. In the monopoly case, no toll is needed since all congestion is internalized. In the symmetric oligopoly case, the toll should equal the congestion damage caused by an extra°i ght times one minus each carrier's airport°ight share (i.e., 3/4 of this damage if the airport has four symmetric carriers). The atomistic model would imply that the toll equals the full congestion damage from an extra°ight. Although Daniel's (1995) empirical¯ndings do not support the internalization hypothesis, Brueckner (2002) and Mayer and Sinai (2002) provide a±rmative evidence. Their empirical results show that the number of delays falls as airport concentration rises, holding the other determinants of delays constant. As predicted, this outcome re°ects greater internalization of congestion as carrier market power grows.
The previous analysis of internalization is limited by its focus on a single congested airport, abstracting from network considerations. For example, Brueckner's (2002) analysis portrays an unrealistic route structure where a congested airport is connected to one other (uncongested) endpoint, while Daniel (1995) takes a similar approach. To overcome this limitation, providing results that are more relevant to real-world practice, the internalization phenomenon should be investigated in a network context. Such a setting may include multiple congested airports, which serve as network hubs, with hub dominance generating highly asymmetric°ight shares at such airports. The present paper analyzes internalization and congestion pricing in this more-complex setting.
The assumed network structure is shown in Figure 1 . Two airlines, denoted 1 and 2, serve four cities, A, B, H, and K. City H is a hub for airline 1, while city K is a hub for airline 2.
Airline 1 serves the city-pair markets AH, BH, AB, HK, with passengers in market AB required to connect at the hub H. Similarly, airline 2 serves the city-pair markets AK, BK, AB, and HK, with its AB passengers connecting at K. For simplicity, all city-pair markets have the same demand for air travel. Airports A and B are assumed to be uncongested in equilibrium, while the hub airports H and K experience congestion.
In common with Brueckner (2002) , this network structure includes city-pair markets such as AH, where a congested airport is connected to an uncongested endpoint, with the route served by a monopoly carrier (markets BH, AK, BK also have these features). However, the network structure also contains a city-pair market, HK, that connects two congested airports, with this market subject to competition between carriers 1 and 2. Finally, market AB connects two uncongested airports, but passengers in this market generate congestion because of their need to connect at either hub H or K. In addition, this market is subject to competition between the two airlines.
The paper analyzes whether the internalization principle, and the associated congestionpricing rules, from previous work apply in this network setting. The analysis shows that the answer is a±rmative, and the results can be most easily grasped when stated in terms of the congestion-pricing rule. As in Brueckner's model, this rule states that the congestion toll levied on each one of an airline's°ights at a given airport equals the congestion damage from an extra°i ght times one minus the carrier's airport°ight share. Thus, zero congestion tolls are charged at the uncongested airports, A and B. Positive tolls are charged at the congested airports H and K, but these tolls are asymmetric across carriers because of their di®erent usage of the airports. Since airline 1 operates more°ights at hub H, thus internalizing more congestion, each of its°ights (those operating on routes AH, BH and HK) is charged a lower toll at H than each of airline 2's°ights, which operate on the HK route. The reverse pattern holds at airport K, with airline 2 paying a low toll per°ight and airline 1 facing a high toll for its HK°ights.
This toll structure is potentially controversial because, despite concerns about hub dominance and its anticompetitive e®ects (see Borenstein (1989) ), a low toll is charged to an airport's dominant carrier, with a high toll paid by the airline with the lower°ight share.
The paper is organized as follows. As background for the more-complex network analysis, section 2 develops the model in a simple setting with just two airports, one congested and one uncongested. Section 3 analyzes the network case from Figure 1 and characterizes the socially optimal allocation of tra±c. Section 4 then characterizes the equilibrium tra±c allocation in the network model and derives the congestion pricing rule. Section 5 o®ers conclusions.
The Model

The setup
To develop the model, the discussion focuses for simplicity on the case where a single congested airport is connected to one uncongested airport. In this case, there is only one city-pair market and one set of passengers to consider. The analysis of the network case in Figure 1 requires several modi¯cations to this setup, which are introduced in Section 3 below.
The model distinguishes between two travel periods at a given airport, denoted peak and o®-peak. The peak period consists of a set of relatively short time intervals containing the day's most desirable travel times, such as early morning or late afternoon. The o®-peak period represents travel times not included in the peak.
To avoid inessential complications, the o®-peak period is assumed to be uncongested at both airports over the range of passenger allocations examined in the model. In e®ect, the demand for o®-peak travel is assumed to be small enough relative to airport capacity that o®-peak congestion never occurs. By contrast, the congested airport always experiences peak-period congestion over the range of relevant allocations, while the other airport is again uncongested during the peak.
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At the congested airport, peak congestion depends on the number of°ights operating during the peak period, denoted n p . Congestion raises an airline's operating costs, so that cost per°ight is given by c in the o®-peak period and by c + g(n p ) in the congested peak period, where g is nondecreasing and convex. The function g (¢) must equal zero when n p is su±ciently small, but its positive range (where g is increasing) is assumed to be relevant. All°ights are assumed to use identical aircraft with¯xed seat capacity s, and a 100 percent load factor is assumed, so that all seats are¯lled.
To see the e®ect of congestion on passenger time costs, consider the demand side of the model. Passengers are represented by a continuum with index µ. For simplicity, µ is uniformly distributed between zero and one with unit density, so that the total mass of passengers is unity. Passenger utility is given by the sum of consumption x and travel bene¯ts B, with u = x + B. Since consumption is equal to income minus the airfare, it follows that travel decisions can be based on the di®erence between bene¯ts B and the fare.
Travel bene¯ts, which depend on µ, di®er for peak and o®-peak travel. The bene¯ts from o®-peak travel are given by the function b o (µ). The bene¯ts of peak travel, which are a®ected by congestion and thus by n p , are represented by B p (µ; n p )´b p (µ) ¡ t(n p ). The function b p thus represents the \gross" bene¯t of peak travel, which would apply in the absence of congestion. The function t represents the additional passenger time costs resulting from travel during the congested peak period. The additively separable form of B p is a key assumption that simpli¯es the analysis. The implication of separability, which may be unrealistic, is that time costs t(n p ) do not depend on µ, which makes them identical for all consumers. 2 Like g, t(¢) is assumed to be nondecreasing and convex, and its positive range (where the function is increasing) is assumed to be relevant. Both peak and o®-peak bene¯ts are assumed to be increasing across the passenger continuum, with b 0 o (µ); b 0 p (µ) > 0 holding for all µ. In addition, to ensure a simple division of passengers between the peak and o®-peak periods, the bene¯t functions are assumed to satisfy a \single-crossing" assumption. In particular, one of the following relationships holds for all
For simplicity, the analysis focuses on the¯rst case, where the peak bene¯t function is always steeper than the o®-peak function.
To understand the intuition underlying the assumptions on the bene¯t functions, µ can be viewed as an index of the passenger's tendency to travel on business. Since business travel, associated with a high µ, is a crucial job requirement, both peak and o®-peak travel bene¯ts should be high relative to bene¯ts for a low-µ leisure traveler. As a result, b 0 p ; b 0 o > 0 should hold. Moreover, since business travel must occur during the early and late peak hours to avoid disruption of the work day, peak travel bene¯ts should increase relative to o®-peak bene¯ts as
The social optimum
The social optimum is an allocation of passengers to the peak and o®-peak periods that maximizes welfare, which equals the di®erence between travel bene¯ts for passengers and airline costs. Given the single-crossing assumption, the optimal allocation has the natural property that high-µ passengers use the peak period, with low-µ passengers traveling o®-peak.
The optimization problem then involves choosing the critical point µ ¤ that separates the two groups of passengers. In addition, a lower bound µ is chosen, below which consumers do not travel.
The welfare measure (travel bene¯ts minus airline costs) can be written
( 1) where n o is the number of o®-peak°ights (recall that the density of µ is unitary). The discreteness of peak and o®-peak°ights is ignored, with both n p and n o chosen in a continuous fashion to satisfy the relations sn p = 1 ¡ µ ¤ and sn o = µ ¤ ¡ µ (recall that s gives seats per°i ght). Substituting in (1), W can then be rewritten as
The¯rst-order condition for choice of µ ¤ is given by
where n p = (1 ¡ µ ¤ )=s. 4 The¯rst expression in (3) gives the change in travel bene¯ts for a passenger who is switched from the o®-peak to the peak period, who gains b p (µ ¤ ) ¡ t(n p ) in peak bene¯ts while losing b o (µ ¤ ) in o®-peak bene¯ts. Because the presence of the extra peak passenger requires the airline to operate 1=s additional°ights, costs rise by (1=s)g(n p ), the second term in (3). In addition, the extra passenger generates a congestion e®ect. Because of the required increase in peak°ights, time cost rises by (1=s)t 0 (n p ) for each of 1¡µ ¤ existing peak passengers, for a total increase of n p t 0 (n p ). The added congestion also raises operating costs for each existing peak°ight by (1=s)g 0 (n p ), for a total increase of (n p =s)g 0 (n p ). The congestion e®ect caused by the extra passenger is thus
With all these considerations taken into account, the optimal µ ¤ thus balances the individual gain from additional peak travel against the incremental congestion and operating costs it generates.
At an interior solution, it can be shown that µ satis¯es b o (µ) = c=s. Thus, for the lowest-µ passenger to°y, travel bene¯ts are just equal to the cost of providing a seat.
Oligopoly equilibrium
To develop the oligopoly equilibrium conditions for this simple model, consider the case where two airlines compete. The fares for peak and o®-peak travel are allowed to di®er, and they are denoted f p and f o . To determine the allocation of passengers between the periods in any market equilibrium, observe that, at the point where the continuum divides between the peak and o®-peak, the relevant passenger (whose type is again denoted µ ¤ ) is indi®erent between travel in the two periods. Thus,
indicating that travel bene¯ts net of the fare are equal across periods. Note that n p in this relationship represents total peak°ights for the two carriers, n 1 p + n 2 p . Note also that since b 0 p > b 0 o holds, all passengers with µ > µ ¤ strictly prefer the peak while all passengers with µ < µ ¤ strictly prefer the o®-peak.
When carriers have market power, the o®-peak fare, which is paid by the lowest-µ passenger to°y, will be set to exhaust travel bene¯t for that passenger, with f o = b o (µ). Substituting into the above indi®erence relationship, the peak fare can then be written
o and n 2 o denote the carriers' o®-peak°ights, µ ¤ and µ then satisfy
. Solving for µ ¤ and µ, and substituting into the above fare solutions, f p and f o can be expressed as functions of the four°ight variables.
Carrier i's pro¯t is written
Its goal is to maximize (4) by choice of n i o and n i p subject to the above relationships between the fares and the n variables. In doing so, carrier i treats the other carrier's°ight choices as parametric. Assuming interior solutions for all variables, and imposing symmetry, the¯rst-order condition for n i p reduces to 5
Comparing (5) to the optimality condition (3), similarities and di®erences are apparent. First, note that the¯rst line of (5) is almost identical to the expression in (3), with the key di®erence being that the congestion terms are multiplied by 1=2. Thus, each carrier internalizes only half of the congestion imposed by an additional°ight. But this fraction represents the congestion that the carrier imposes on itself and its own passengers, which is therefore taken into account in its decisions.
While the carrier naturally internalizes the impact of congestion on its own operating costs, exploitation of market power accounts for the internalization of passenger time costs. To see this conclusion, note from the indi®erence condition that the¯rst term in (5) equals the fare di®erential f p ¡ f o between the peak and o®-peak periods. Now suppose that the carrier moves a passenger from the o®-peak to the peak period, with appropriate changes in its peak and o®-peak°ights. Referring to (5), the revenue earned from this passenger increases by an amount equal to the fare di®erential f p ¡ f o , represented by the¯rst term. But to induce the given passenger to move between the periods, the carrier must accept a peak fare reduction of t 0 (n p )=s, which o®sets the increase in passenger time costs from higher peak congestion. This fare reduction in turn generates a revenue loss of (n p =2)t 0 (n p ) on the carrier's inframarginal peak passengers, which must subtracted from the revenue gain from the given passenger. In this way, the carrier internalizes the e®ect of congestion on the time costs of its own passengers.
However, the e®ects of congestion on the costs incurred by the other airline and its passengers are not considered.
A \residual" market-power e®ect, which is not bene¯cial, is captured by the last term in (5). This residual e®ect arises because, to increase peak°ights, the airline must convince lower-µ passengers, who value the peak relatively less, to use that period, an inducement that requires a further decline in f p . In other words, because b 0 p > b 0 o holds, peak bene¯ts fall by more than o®-peak bene¯ts as lower-µ passengers are added to the peak, necessitating a further reduction in f p to maintain the indi®erence condition.
It is easily seen that the e®ect of uninternalized congestion is to make µ ¤ too small, so that too many passengers tend to use the peak period (recall that their number is 1 ¡ µ ¤ ). However, because the fare reduction underlying the residual market-power e®ect is unappealing to the carrier, it tends also to allocate too few passengers to the peak period. As a result, the net e®ect on peak usage is indeterminate, making the comparison between the equilibrium and optimum ambiguous.
A congestion toll can be used to force the carriers to take account of the congestion that they do not internalize. The toll per°ight should equal
where the term in brackets is the congestion damage caused by an extra°ight and the multiplicative factor is one minus each carrier's°ight share ®, which in this case equals 1=2. It is easily seen that, when this toll expression enters the¯rst-order condition (5), the 1/2 factors disappear, so that congestion is fully taken into account.
It is important to recognize that imposition of a congestion toll may not always be welfareimproving. To see this conclusion, observe that if the residual market-power e®ect dominates, leading to underuse of the peak period, then by further restricting peak usage, the toll pushes the equilibrium farther away from the optimum. Only if the residual e®ect is very small in magnitude compared to the congestion e®ect can we be assured that a toll system is desirable.
This outcome, of course, re°ects second-best considerations, with the toll correcting only one of the distortions re°ected in (5).
Network Analysis: The Social Optimum
With the above background, the discussion now turns to the analysis of tra±c allocations in the realistic network depicted in Figure 1 . Several general observations regarding this network setting are useful at the outset. First, in contrast to the simple model, where there was no distinction between an airline route and a city-pair market, this distinction is important in the network context. In particular, while a route such as AH serves passengers in the AH city-pair market, the route is used by passengers in the AB market as well (these passengers also°y on route BH). A related point is that, in the network context, each city-pair market will have its own µ ¤ and µ critical values. These values are therefore market-speci¯c, not route-speci¯c, a distinction that did not arise in the simple model.
An additional observation concerns the routing for passengers in city-pair markets AH and BH. While these passengers could also make connecting trips through hub K on airline 2 (traveling from A or B to K and then to H), they are assumed to favor nonstop travel on carrier 1. Similarly, AK and BK passengers could travel through hub H, but they shun such connecting trips. These routing assumptions can be justi¯ed by assuming that passengers will never take connecting°ights when a nonstop°ight is available, and relaxing them would add considerable complexity to the analysis.
A¯nal observation concerns the rationale for the network's hub-and-spoke structure. As is well recognized, such a network structure emerges in practice because of \economies of tra±c density," under which cost per passenger on a route declines as tra±c density rises (re°ecting increasing returns at the route level). 6 Unfortunately, explicit incorporation of this density e®ect would make analysis of the network case exceedingly cumbersome. As a result, the simple assumption that cost per passenger in the absence of congestion is a constant, equal to c=s, is used instead. Under this assumption, however, a formal rationale for the hub-and-spoke structure is missing. Indeed, a preferred arrangement would be to serve AB passengers with nonstop service between the uncongested airports A and B, avoiding the congested hubs. To¯nesse this issue, allowing a manageable analysis of congestion within a hub-and-spoke structure, the analysis takes a shortcut. It arbitrarily imposes the assumption that AB tra±c must pass through the hub, even though the microfoundations for this pattern
are not explicitly present. The lessons of the analysis would clearly generalize, however, to a model with economies of density, but the cost in terms of analytical complexity would be high.
To begin the analysis of the network case, the¯rst maintained assumption is that demand for travel in each city-pair market is the same. Thus, all of the markets AH, BH, AK, BK, AB, and HK share the common travel bene¯t functions b p and b o , and each market has a uniform distribution of µ and a unitary mass of passengers.
However, because of the network structure, the time cost of congestion is computed differently for some passengers than in the simple model of section 2. Note¯rst that, because passengers traveling in markets AH and BH use only one congested airport, their time costs are analogous to those in the simple model, being given by t(m H p ), where m H p gives total peak°i ghts at hub H. Similarly, time costs for passengers in markets AK and BK are given by t(m K p ), where m K p is total peak°ights at hub K. However, since passengers traveling in market AB must connect at one of the hubs, they endure twice as much congestion as an AH passenger or other similar passenger. In other words, the AB passenger experiences congestion on landing at the hub and endures further congestion when his connecting°ight departs. Therefore, the time costs for an AB passenger connecting at hub H are given by 2t(m H p ), while costs for a trip through hub K are 2t(m K p ). Passengers traveling in market HK, who take a nonstop°ight, also experience congestion twice, but these experiences occur at di®erent airports, once at the origin and again at the destination. Therefore, time costs for an HK passenger are equal to
. It should be noted that this last time cost expression involves the implicit assumption that a°ight departing H in the peak period arrives at K during that airport's peak period. This outcome is guaranteed, however, only if the°ight is instantaneous. At the cost of somewhat greater complexity, the setup could be made more realistic by explicitly viewing the model as portraying round-trip travel. Then, for a round trip originating during H's peak period, time cost on the outbound leg would be t(m H p ), with a zero cost incurred at K since the°ight arrives after that airport's peak has passed. A peak-period return departure from K would generate a time cost of t(m K p ) and a zero cost at H, implying a total time cost for the round trip of t(m H p ) + t(m K p ). While this expression is the same as the one above, the round trip orientation would require doubling the time costs for the other types of trips considered above. Because the implications of this alternate model di®er only slightly from those developed below, the simpler approach based on instantaneous°ight times is retained.
The above reasoning can also be applied to derive the congestion costs incurred by the airlines. Since°ights on the AH and BH routes use only one congested airport (hub H), the peak operating cost per°ight is given by c + g(m H p ). Similarly, peak operating cost on the routes AK and BK is given by c +g(m K p ). Because HK°ights use both congested hub airports, peak operating cost is given by c + g(m H p ) + g(m K p ). Additional notation is required for the analysis, as follows. Let µ ¤ AH denote the critical µ ¤ value for market AH. By symmetry, this value can be used to represent critical values for the other analogous markets, BH, AK, and BK. Similarly, let µ ¤ AB and µ ¤ HK represent the critical µ ¤ values for markets AB and HK, and let the µ values for the various markets be labeled analogously. Let n p be the total number of peak°ights operated on the routes between A and B and hub H (i.e., the number of AH°ights plus the number of BH°ights), and let n o be the number of o®-peak°ights on these routes. By symmetry, these same variables can be used to denote total peak and o®-peak°ights on the routes AK and BK. Finally, let k p and k o denote the number of peak and o®-peak°ights on the HK route.
Using all of the above information, and exploiting symmetry, an expression for social welfare (travel bene¯ts minus airline costs) is easily derived. Welfare equals
To see the use of symmetry in (7), note¯rst that travel bene¯ts in markets AH, BH, AK and BK are just four times the AH value. In addition, observe that m H p = m K p will hold at the optimum, with the common value denoted m p . This fact implies that HK time costs t(m H p ) + t(m K p ) can be written 2t(m p ), with HK operating cost c + g(m H p ) + g (m K p ) written c + 2g(m p ). Finally, note that the second to last expression in (7) gives operating costs on routes AH, BH, AK, and BK, which are just double the costs through one hub.
While the constraints relating n p to µ ¤ and µ in the model of section 2 were simple, the appropriate constraints in the present context are more complex. The relevant constraints are as follows:
The constraint in (8) says that the number of°ights at a given hub airport is equal to total°i ghts on the AH and BH (or AK and BK) routes, n p , plus total°ights on the HK route, k p .
To understand (9), observe¯rst that AB connecting tra±c is split between the hubs, a division that is e±cient because it limits congestion. As a result, (1 ¡ µ ¤ AB )=2 peak passengers use each of the two hub routings in this market. But since each connecting passenger uses two°ights, the number of peak passengers to be handled on each hub routing is double this amount, implying that the number of peak°ights required to accommodate them is (1 ¡ µ ¤ AB )=s. In addition, (1 ¡ µ ¤ AH ) passengers must be served in each of the city-pair markets AH and BH, which means that 2(1 ¡ µ ¤ AH )=s additional°ights must be operated on the AH and BH routes. Of course, nonstop and connecting passengers will be commingled on the n p°i ghts that are operated through the hub. An analogous discussion applies to routes AK and BK. Total peak tra±c in market HK is (1 ¡ µ ¤ HK ), so that the required number of HK°ights is given by (10). Recalling that o®-peak tra±c is given by the market's µ ¤ value minus its µ value, (11) and (12) give o®-peak°ights in analogous fashion to (9) and (10).
The social optimum is found by choosing µ ¤ AH , µ ¤ AB , µ ¤ HK , µ AH , µ AB , µ HK , n p , n o , k p , k o , and m p to maximize (7) subject to (8){(12). It can be shown that, after some manipulation, the¯rst-order conditions for the¯rst three variables reduce to
The interpretation of (13){ (15) follows that of the optimality condition (3) from the simple model. The¯rst term in each equation gives the change in travel bene¯ts when a passenger in the relevant city pair market is switched from the o®-peak to the peak period. Note that, because they encounter congestion twice, the travel-bene¯t expressions for passengers in the AB and HK markets involve subtraction of 2t(m p ) rather than t(m p ). Accommodation of an extra peak passenger in type-AH and AB markets requires 1=s and 2=s additional°ights, respectively, generating extra operating costs of g(m p )=s and 2g(m p )=s, which appear in (13) and (14). Since each of the 1=s additional°ights required by an extra HK passenger encounters congestion twice, operating costs rise by 2g(m p )=s (see (15)). Lastly, the congestion caused by an extra type-AH passenger equals (13), an expression analogous to the congestion term in (3), but where m p replaces n p . However, each extra AB or HK passenger generates twice as much congestion, so that the corresponding terms in (14){ (15) are multiplied by two.
Because the conditions in (14) and (15) have exactly the same form, it follows that µ ¤ AB = µ ¤ HK . Thus, the peak tra±c levels in markets AB and HK are the same at the optimum, a consequence of the parallel features of these markets. However, because the type-AH (13) is equated to an expression half as large as the corresponding expressions for the other markets, it follows that this di®erential is smaller than those in (14) and (15). Recalling that b 0 p ¡ b 0 o > 0, it then follows that µ ¤ AH < µ ¤ AB = µ ¤ HK . Thus, because a type-AH peak passenger generates lower operating and congestion costs and incurs a lower time cost than passengers in the other two markets, the optimal volume of such passengers (1 ¡ µ ¤ AH ) is greater. Assuming interior solutions, it can be shown that the¯rst-order conditions for the µ variables reduce to b o (µ AH ) = c=s, b o (µ AB ) = 2c=s, and b o (µ HK ) = c=s. Again, these conditions say that, for the lowest-µ passenger to°y in each market, travel bene¯t equals the cost of providing the required seat(s). Note that because two seats are needed for an AB passenger, it follows that µ AB is larger than the µ values for the other markets. This fact in turn implies that the total number of AB passengers (peak plus o®-peak) is smaller than in the type-AH and HK markets. Because µ AH = µ HK , these latter markets have identical passenger totals but a di®erent peak/o®-peak split (see above).
Network Analysis: Equilibrium
To begin the characterization of equilibrium, consider¯rst the type-AH markets, where the airlines operate as monopolists. In these markets, the fares and critical µ values need not be the same across airlines, although symmetry will hold in equilibrium. The indi®erence conditions and the µ conditions for these markets are
where f i AH;p and f i AH;o i = 1; 2, are the peak and o®-peak type-AH fares charged by the two airlines, and µ ¤i AH and µ i AH are the critical µ values. In market HK, where the airlines compete, they must charge the same fares, and there is just one set of µ ¤ and µ values. The relevant conditions are
where the fare notation is self-explanatory. Note that the time cost of an HK trip in (18) is given by the earlier asymmetric expression t(m H p ) + t(m K p ). Since o®-peak connecting trips in market AB are identical regardless of whether the passenger°ies on airline 1 or 2, the airlines must charge identical o®-peak fares for such trips.
However, since the two hub airports could experience di®erent degrees of congestion, peak AB trips may not be equivalent, and as a result, peak AB fares may di®er across airlines. Thus, while there is a single µ condition for this market, written f AB;o = b o (µ AB ), there are two indi®erence conditions, which are written
Note from (19) and (20) that any AB fare di®erence between the carriers re°ects a di®erence in the time cost of the trip, a consequence of a potential di®erence between m H p and m K p . 7 The next step is to derive the constraints relating the numbers of°ights to the µ ¤ and µ variables. These constraints have a structure analogous to that of (8){(12), adjusted so that symmetry is not imposed at the outset, and they are given by
In these equations, n 1 p and n 1 o denote total peak and o®-peak°ights operated by airline 1 on the routes AH and BH, with n 2 p and n 2 o denoting airline 2's total peak and o®-peak°ights on routes AK and BK. In equilibrium, these variables will be symmetric across airlines, with the common values denoted n p and n o (consistent with the notation used in the analysis of the social optimum). In addition, k 1 p and k 1 o denote airline 1's peak and o®-peak°ights on route HK, with k 2 p and k 2 o denoting airline 2's°ights. Note that k 1 p + k 2 p equals the total°ight variable k p from above, while k
Eqs. (21), (22), (24) and (26) are analogous to (8), (10) and (12), with total HK°ights written as the sum of the individual carrier°ights on the route. To understand (23), observe that peak AB passengers generate a need for 2(1 ¡ µ ¤ AB ) total seats on the routes AH, BH, AK and BK (two seats for each passenger). In addition, AH and BH passengers create a need for 2(1 ¡ µ ¤1 AH ) seats on these two routes, with AK and BK passengers generating a need for 2(1 ¡ µ ¤2 AH ) seats on these two routes. Eq. (23) sums these quantities and divides by s to generate the total peak°ights needed on the four routes connecting A and B to the two hubs.
A parallel interpretation applies to (25).
Pro¯t for airline 1 is written
While the¯rst line of (27) is self-explanatory (recall that the airline serves two type-AH markets), the terms multiplying the fares in the second line, which give peak and o®-peak tra±c levels in market AB, require explanation. To interpret the¯rst of these terms, note that total peak seats o®ered by airline 1 on routes AH and BH equals sn 1 p . Of these seats, 2(1 ¡ µ ¤1 AH ) are taken by passengers in markets AH and BH, leaving the rest for AB connecting passengers. Since each such passenger uses two seats, division by two yields their number. The second multiplicative term has a similar interpretation. This way of writing pro¯t is needed to capture all the degrees of freedom available to the airline in its optimization problem. Airline 1's goal is to maximize pro¯t in (27), taking as given the choices of airline 2. Its decision variables include the°ight totals n 1 o , n 1 p , k 1 o , k 1 p . In addition, since the airline is a monopolist in markets AH and BH, it can choose tra±c levels in these markets directly, which adds µ ¤1 AH and µ 1 AH to its list of choice variables.
To generate¯rst-order conditions for this problem in the presence of the many constraints considered above, the following procedure is used. First, the fare conditions (16) 
optimally, treating the analogous list of variables for airline 2 as parametric.
Making use of the¯rst-order conditions for n 1 o , k 1 o , and µ 1 AH , and imposing symmetry, thē rst-order conditions for µ ¤1 AH , n 1 p , and k 1 p reduce to
To interpret these conditions, observe that the¯rst and second terms in each equation, which
give the change in travel bene¯ts as well as the cost of operating additional°ights when an extra passenger is shifted into the peak period, are the same as the corresponding terms in the optimality conditions (13){(15). As in the equilibrium analysis of section 2, the last term in each of the conditions represents a residual market-power a®ect, caused by the need to persuade passengers with lower relative valuations of peak travel to enter the peak period. 8
The key comparison, however, is between the congestion terms in (28){(30) and those in the optimality conditions (13){(15), a comparison that tells the extent to which congestion is internalized. First, compare (13) and (28) to gauge internalization of the congestion caused by type-AH passengers. The congestion term in (13) includes the multiplicative factor m p , indicating that a type-AH passenger imposes congestion on the m p total°ights at the hub he uses. However, the corresponding term in (28) is m p ¡ k p =2, which indicates that some of the type-AH passenger's congestion is not internalized. The uninternalized portion represents the congestion borne by k p =2°ights, and these°ights are those operated by the other airline on the route HK, which represent half the k p total. The given airline has no incentive to internalize the congestion imposed on these°ights since they are operated by the other carrier.
Similarly, a comparison of (14) and (29) shows that part of the congestion caused by AB passengers is not internalized. Because such a passenger connects at the hub,°ying both in and out of the airport, he e®ectively congests the hub's m p°i ghts twice, accounting for the 2m p factor in (14). The smaller factor 2(m p ¡ k p =2) in (29) shows that the airline ignores the impact of this double congestion on the k p =2°ights operated on route HK by the other airline, as in the case of AH passengers.
It is interesting to note that, even though competition occurs in the AB market, the congestion caused by AB passengers is internalized to the same extent as that caused by type-AH passengers, over the whom the airline has monopoly power. In other words, in both cases, the airline fails to internalize the congestion imposed on the HK°ights operated by the other carrier. This fact suggests a conclusion that is not fully apparent in the simple model.
In particular, even though the market power of carriers (which leads them to recognize the congestion-sensitivity of fares) is the key to internalization, the degree of market power appears not to be crucial. Instead, regardless of how much market power passengers experience, the extent to which the congestion they cause is internalized depends only on the airline's°ight share at the congested airport.
Finally, a comparison of (15) and (30) shows the same lack of internalization of part of the congestion created by HK passengers. Because an HK passenger°ies between two hubs, he imposes congestion on 2m p°i ghts, accounting for the appearance of this factor in (15).
However, the airline ignores the congestion imposed by this passenger on the other carrier's type-AH°ights, which is created by serving that airline's hub. This congestion a®ects n p such°i ghts. In addition, the airline ignores the fact that an extra HK passenger twice congests the other carrier's k p =2°ights on this route, once at each endpoint. Summing these e®ects, the extra HK passenger e®ectively congests n p + k p = m p of the other carrier's°ights. This congestion is not internalized, accounting for the m p factor in (30), which is too small by half.
Observe that, because the inequality m p < 2(m p ¡ k p =2) holds after simple rearrangement, a smaller portion of congestion is internalized for HK than for AB passengers (compare (29) and (30)). With the perceived cost of serving AB passengers thus higher, it follows that µ ¤ AB > µ ¤ HK , implying a lower peak tra±c volume in market AB than in HK. 9
As in the case of the simple model of section 2, peak-period tolls can be levied to ensure full internalization of congestion. Given the above discussion, internalization requires raising cost per peak passenger by the following amounts: by (k p =2)[t 0 + g 0 =s] for AH passengers, by
for AB passengers, and by m p [t 0 + g 0 =s] for HK passengers. Note, however, that since the AB passenger takes two°ights, the correct adjustment is given by raising his cost by
These adjustments can be implemented by the following toll system. First, each airline should be charged a congestion toll of (k p =2)[st 0 + g 0 ] for each peak°ight operated at its own hub airport. Dividing by s, this toll raises cost per passenger by the appropriate amount for type-AH and AB passengers (see above). Then, each airline should be charged a toll of
for each peak°ight it operates at the other carrier's hub. Combined with the own-hub toll, the total toll charge incurred by an HK°ight then equals (
, which yields the correct adjustment in cost per HK passenger.
This toll system can be represented by a direct generalization of the rule already derived for the simple model of section 2. In particular, the toll paid by an airline at a given airport is equal to the congestion damage caused by an extra°ight times one minus the carrier's airport°ight share. To see that the above system embodies this rule, recall that the damage from an extra °ight at either hub equals m p [st 0 (m p ) + g 0 (m p )]. Then consider the following relationships:
Own-hub toll = (1 ¡°ight share)¤(damage from an extra°ight)
Similarly,
Other-hub toll = (1 ¡°ight share)¤(damage from an extra°ight)
Of course, since congestion damage is zero at an uncongested airport, no tolls should be levied at airports A and B.
The above results are summarized as follows:
Proposition. In a network context, the appropriate congestion tolls at an airport are carrier-speci¯c and equal the congestion damage from an extra°ight times one minus the carrier's airport°ight share.
As in the simple model, the toll system in (31){(32) can be viewed as providing a peak toll schedule, which relates the proper toll to the airport tra±c level m p and to the (endogenous)°i ght shares of the carriers. Consistent with Cournot behavior, the airlines would view the toll per°ight as parametric and unin°uenced by their own decisions, although the planner would set the toll according to the given schedule. Each carrier would then adjust tra±c so as to internalize all the congestion it creates. Alternatively, the above toll expressions could be evaluated at the optimum, and the planner could charge a°at peak toll that is unresponsive to airport activity. However, computing the°at toll requires knowing the optimum, information which is not needed to generate the toll schedule. Computing that schedule only requires knowledge of the congestion damage from an extra°ight, which could be computed using airline operations and cost data along with estimates of the value of passenger time.
Several additional observations regarding this toll system are useful. First, as in the simple model, imposition of such a system may not be welfare improving because it corrects only one distortion, leaving the residual market-power e®ect in place. Use of tolls is guaranteed to be desirable only if the latter e®ect is small. Second, the toll system may be controversial. The reason is that it charges a low toll to the hub airport's dominant carrier while charging a high toll to the carrier with the low°ight share. While this pattern re°ects respectively high and low internalization of congestion at the airport by the two types of carriers, it might appear to be the wrong response to concerns about market power by the dominant hub airline (see Borenstein (1989) ). However, since such market power is fully represented in the model, the conclusions of the analysis take it into account. As a result, concerns about the anticompetitive e®ect of the toll system would appear to be misplaced.
Conclusion
The likely resurgence of air tra±c in the U.S. means that airport congestion is a problem that must soon be confronted by policy makers. As part of their policy response, it is probable that some form of congestion pricing will be imposed at selected U.S. airports in the relatively near future. The theory developed in this paper, which extends the results of Brueckner (2002) , provides an important guide for the formulation of congestion pricing rules. In particular, the theory says that the congestion tolls levied on the various airlines at a particular airport should generally be di®erent, with the tolls being inversely related to a carrier's airport°ight share.
Internalization of airport congestion is the reason for this inverse relationship. In operating another peak°ight, a carrier takes account of the congestion damage imposed on the other°i ghts it operates. If these°ights account for a large share of the airport's tra±c, then most of the congestion created by the additional°ight is internalized, justifying a low toll. By contrast, if the carrier operates only a few of the airport's°ights, then little internalization occurs, and a high toll is needed to force the carrier to take into account the congestion damage it causes.
The resulting°ight-share rule is easy to implement, and it could help policymakers design proper toll systems at U.S. airports. 
